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that the ideal can be realized except by the church, or at any rate on the basis of religion. It is hard, however, to discover any good reasons in support of their position. The fact that we have not yet developed a satisfactory system of moral instruction—if that is a fact—is no proof that none can be developed. The only way to solve the problem is to make an attempt to solve it, and to learn by experiment. The object is, of course, not to do away with religious instruction, but to leave this to the church and family, and to supplement it in the public schools by moral instruction. Perhaps we can learn something in this regard from the Ethical Culture Sunday-schools, which instead of denying the possibility of non-religious moral instruction on *a priori* grounds, are making an honest effort to solve the problem, and are, in my humble opinion, meeting with a fair measure of success.

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POLITICS AND THE MORAL LAW. By Gustav Ruemelin, Late Chancellor of the University of Tübingen. Translated from the German by Rudolf Tombo, Jr. Edited with an Introduction and Notes by Frederick W. Holls. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1901.

The editor is unquestionably right in regarding Professor Ruemelin's address, delivered at Tübingen seventeen years ago, as "a notable and important contribution" to one branch of the science of ethics. Possibly its chief importance lies in the fact that it is a defence of the view that politics, *i. e.*, the conduct of public affairs, is not subject to the laws of morality recognized in private life, by a man whose moral earnestness is as manifest as his capacity for lucid statement is rare. He stigmatizes the teachings of Macchiavelli as infamous, and condemns the so-called Jesuit maxim that the end justifies the means. He rejoices in noticing "in public affairs an increasing tendency toward nobler ends." It is always, in his judgment, "a most deplorable instance of conflicting duties, when the law of political necessity thrusts aside the recognized and ordinary standard of right." And he maintains that the politician should act under the very highest sense of moral obligation, even when his duty to the state necessitates

breach of good faith, cruelty, deceit and falsehood in dealing with other nations.

But he is convinced that neither the law of love nor the law of justice is applicable to the state. "The state has no parents to honor, it takes no marriage vow which it might violate." It must punish murder by killing and is compelled for self-preservation to raise millions for the purpose of procuring the most effective instruments of death. It must "covet houses and fields." "The state must endeavor to anticipate even a threatened blow with an energetic counter-stroke." The citizens of one state "may rejoice over the weakening of a neighboring state and may be impelled to derive a selfish advantage therefrom, nay, even to strike an aggressive blow." "Altruism is the gospel of the citizen, self-preservation that of the state." The state is neither subject to the golden rule nor to the law of justice as applicable to private morality. It is "unending and sufficient to itself," having an independent principle for the guidance of its action. Consequently there should be no misplaced moral sensitiveness. "Where it is allowable to take life, it cannot be improper merely to deceive." It would be folly not to make use of spies, bribery and corruption.

In a note, Mr. Holls cites as an instance of "the provocation of war which is regarded as inevitable" the notorious conduct of Bismarck in precipitating the Franco-Prussian war, and suggests that impartial history in recording the means to which he resorted will not fail to take into account his real object, the unification of Germany. In another note, he refers to England's repeated promises to evacuate Egypt which were not made to be kept and to Bismarck's disregard for the Treaty of Prague in the case of Schleswig, as showing how the expediency of a state may necessitate a breach of good faith. For the justification of warfare in general from the religious point of view, Mr. Holls thinks that Luther's pamphlet, "Can Soldiers be Christians?" is unsurpassed to this day. From Mr. Spencer Wilkinson's "War and Policy," he quotes a sentence that friends of peace as well as apologists of war have good reason to ponder: "Even when armies and fleets are not employed, their existence and the possibility of their use constantly influence the action of governments."

The reviewer cannot share Mr. Holls' confidence that this book will help to put pending controversies upon a correct theoretical basis. Professor Ruemelin's arguments rest upon as-

sumptions that he does not attempt to prove and that are yet far from being self-evident. Is it true that each state is a law unto itself, exists for its own sake, is unending? History records the death of many a state, and unmistakably points to disregard for the legitimate interests of other nations as a frequent cause of decay and dissolution. Is it true that the relations between corporate bodies are so different from those obtaining between individuals as to place the former beyond the pale of moral obligations recognized as applying to the latter? That a state cannot marry another state is a mere quibble. The question is whether nations may sustain to one another relations that render it possible for them to show truthfulness, fidelity, equity and kindness, as well as the opposite of these qualities. That a nation *must* covet territory, kill criminals and send forth armies, are all gratuitous assertions. It is difficult to see any "coveting" in self-imposed taxation; if a people steals its neighbor's land, greed is likely to be the motive, but there is no necessity for it; society is not obliged to slay its perverts, it may protect itself in other ways; whether war is a necessary and legitimate occupation of a civilized people may, in spite of Luther, be gravely doubted. Is it, finally, a correct social theory that makes altruism the gospel of the individual, and self-preservation the only principle to be recognized by a political organization? In the case of the individual, the legitimate desire for self-preservation is not thwarted but aided by an intelligent regard for the welfare of others. Neither do egoism and altruism appear to be mutually exclusive and hostile principles in the management of public affairs.

One asks with some concern what must be the ultimate effect upon private morality of this view which differs from that ascribed to the Jesuits chiefly in substituting the state for the church, and from that of Macchiavelli in nothing that is essential. It must be reassuring to many a corporation whose gospel is that of self-preservation to reflect that since it cannot honor father and mother nor take unto itself a wife, it need not bother about moral obligations. If good and thoughtful men by this sophistry are led to look upon cruel and unfair, dishonest and deceitful practices as proper and necessary in the conduct of the people's business, are not weak and thoughtless men, with such examples before them, likely to resort to the same methods to preserve their own little lives? More than apologetics of this kind do we need practical suggestions as to how those principles of morality, at least,

that have found recognition in society may be applied to international relations. John Stuart Mill's advice that treaties be made for a definite period only and so as not to bind unborn generations seems more timely and worthy of acceptance than Professor Ruemelin's thesis that political necessity may thrust aside the recognized standard of right. Man does not exist for the sake of the state, but the state, like every other institution, for the sake of man, and it admits of little doubt that that state best serves the interests of humanity, whose intellectual and moral excellence reveals itself not only in the lives of its members but in all its corporate activities as well.

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SCHOOL MANAGEMENT AND METHODS OF INSTRUCTION. By G. Collar, B. A., B. Sc., and C. W. Crook, B. A., B. Sc. Pp. viii, 336. 3s. 6d. Macmillan.

This handy little volume has received the *imprimatur* of the Cambridge experts—Mr. Oscar Browning and Dr. Fletcher—and its inclusion in Macmillan's series of Manuals for Teachers is in itself a sufficient guarantee that there is no jerry-building in its construction. To pursue the metaphor, it is "replete with every modern convenience." It speaks in duly respectful terms of the latest developments in psychology, and has made a successful effort to conceal from view the distasteful technicalities of that subject, while applying without fear or prejudice its broad and important principles. The treatment of school organization is deliberately limited to that of elementary schools, and the authors express the hope that teachers in every grade of school will find the volume useful to them in their labors. I think that this pious aspiration is fulfilled. The secondary school-master may pass over with a sniff the chapters that deal with matter typified by "the fat cat sat on the mat." He may scoff at schedules, stock books, at registers and fee books, and the multitudinous apparatus of school record required by a despotic Board of Education. But with all due deference to his indifference, I do not think any assistant master will be the worse for carefully looking into these details; for, although he may never have occasion to deal at first hand with these devices for filling up the spare time of the teacher, there is much in them from which he may